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1
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world ever came to nuclear annihilation. In this
crisis, Cold War tensions heightened to almost world war status as the United States confronted its
nemesis the Soviet Union to negotiate the fate of Cuba which was now armed with missiles capable of
delivering nuclear warheads to targets thousands of miles away. In this international struggle, the
actions and intentions of Fidel Castro have been dramatically overshadowed by those of United States’
President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.
In United States’ historiography, the importance of Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis has been
marginalized by the threat of Soviet made military hardware in the Western Hemisphere. In
contemporary times, literary and cinematic interpretations of the Cuban Missile Crisis have still excluded
a Cuban perspective in their material. Mark Laffey and Julia Weldes discuss this issue in their article
entitled “Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis” in which a cinematic interpretation of the Cuban Missile
Crisis entitled Thirteen Days (2000) starring Kevin Costner, was screened in Havana. Laffey and Weldes
state that the lack of a Cuban perspective in this movie caused Castro to pose the question “Where are
all the Cubans?”1
In Robert Kennedy’s memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis entitled Thirteen Days ---the primary
source material for the movie--- Castro is only mentioned by name three times. Kennedy mentions
Castro’s pilot in the first chapter of the book saying that the pilot’s “boastful and intoxicated way [of
talking] about the nuclear missiles”2 led American intelligence operatives in Cuba to the discovery of the
missiles in the first place. Kennedy also mentions Castro directly twice in strategies discussed at
President Kennedy’s specially formed Executive Committee meetings. One strategy was the tactic of
stopping the flow of Soviet supplies to Cuba and then “concentrating on Cuba and Castro”3 and the
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other strategy was that the United States government “send a letter to Castro”4 and reach a solution.
The Kennedy administration chose the former in that Soviet supplies to Cuba were stopped by a naval
blockade, but never dealt with Cuba directly. Therefore Cuba and the Castro regime were never even
considered to be a major part of the crisis from the American perspective.
Laffey and Weldes point to the ExComm transcripts for answers to this lack of a Cuban
perspective. In their analysis they state that the U.S. government did not believe Cuba to be important
to the crisis because they believed Cuba to be a “Soviet-puppet state,”5 implying that the Castro regime
was perfectly in line with the ideologies and aspirations of the Soviet Union. This “puppet state” theory
is supported by many documents written by American intelligence officers such as a memorandum CIA
Operations officer William K. Harvey and Acting Chairman of the Board of Estimates Abbot Smith sent to
General Lansdale stating that “the USSR’s primary stake in Cuba is political…. The Soviets value the
Cuban example as showing. . . that the [Soviet] Bloc will provide such a revolutionary regime with the
economic aid required to offset anticipated US economic warfare and to develop the country.”6
Documents pertaining to Cuba such as United States Information Agency memoranda refer to Cuba as
the “1st Soviet satellite in America.”7 Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated at the 1992
Havana Conference that the Kennedy Administration viewed the Castro regime in Cuba as “’puppet’ of
the Soviet Union.”8
However, this theory is based in the United States’ perspective only and does not take into
account the Soviet and Cuban perspectives. Meanwhile Soviet historians and eye witnesses to the event

4

Kennedy, 31
Laffey and Weldes 261
6
William K. Harvey and Abbot Smith to General Lansdale 17 August 1962, in The Kennedys and Cuba: The
Declassified Documentary History ed. Mark J. White (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 136-137
7
Donald M. Wilson to General Edward G. Lansdale July 20, 1962, in Psy-War on Cuba: The Declassified History of
U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda. Ed. Jon Elliston (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1999), 108
8
James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet
Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 34
5

3
such as Sergei Khrushchev state that the Soviet government had little influence in the outcome of the
Cuban Revolution and the placement of missiles into Cuba was intended to be more like aid to a fellow
communist nation than acts of a superior nation on its subordinate. Cuban historians, especially after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, have attempted to redefine the Cuban Missile Crisis
from their own national points of view, independent from the influences of historiography from Russia
and the United States. In their analyses of the event, Cuban historians such as Tomas Acosta and Carlos
Lechuga pose the statement that Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for “mutual defense” and that Cuba
was betrayed by the Soviet Union in negotiations.
After analysis of the early years of the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is my
conclusion that Cuba was not nor ever intended to be a Soviet puppet state. Although Castro’s
revolution has similarities to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, his actions and ambitions were sharply different
from those of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet policymakers especially concerning
strategies during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this thesis, I will analyze the issue of Cuban communism and
how it differed from communism of the Soviet Union’s and how it led to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the
fall of 1962. I will focus mostly on the limited but important Cuban material. I will cite Soviet material
when it is necessary for understanding the ideological and tactical differences between Cuba and the
Soviet Union.
In order to understand the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is first necessary to discuss the
Cuban Revolution and its ideologies that formed independently of the Soviet Union. On January 1, 1959,
Castro had sent Fulgencio Batista into exile and was able to bring the entire island of Cuba under his
control. On the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Sergei Khrushchev, son of Nikita
Khrushchev Premier of the Soviet Union wrote the scholarly article entitled “The Cuban Missile Crisis”
and explained that the success of the Cuban Revolution was due to Castro’s own work and not the work

4
of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev blatantly stated in the introductory paragraphs of this article that “the
entry into Havana… of Fidel Castro’s guerrillas and Batista’s flight failed to attract any particular
attention in Moscow.”9
Sergei Khrushchev buttressed this point by stating that the Soviet embassy in Havana was shut
down in 1952. Sergei Khrushchev built on this by stating that his father asked for information on Cuba
during the time shortly after the success of the Cuban Revolution, “neither the International
Department of the [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee, nor the KGB intelligence,
nor the military intelligence had any idea who Fidel was, what he fought for, and what aims he
pursued.”10 Sergei Khrushchev emphasized this point by stating that his father asked the Cuban
communists for their opinion on Castro and was told that “Castro was a member of the big bourgeoisie
and a CIA agent to boot, [and that there was no] particular difference between him and Batista.”11
Richard Gott, author of the book Cuba: A New History confirmed this theory by citing a passage
from Khrushchev’s memoir. “When Fidel Castro led his revolution to victory, and entered Havana with
his troops, we had no idea what political course his regime would follow.”12 Gott then cited a statement
made by Che Guevara biographer Jon Lee Anderson who argued “the Kremlin did not suddenly
‘discover’ Cuba by spinning a globe after reading the news reports of its revolution.”13 Anderson
suggested that the Soviet Union had been keeping track of the Cuban Revolution and had tentative
theories of its ambitions. Gott qualified Sergei Khrushchev’s statement by indicating that although
certain members of the Soviet Union may have been keeping track of Castro and his revolution this
information never “percolated through to the Politburo.14”15 Gott’s argument is the most believable due
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5
to the fact that although it is possible that the Soviet bureaucracy knew of the Cuban Revolution, it is
obvious that Nikita Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet leadership did not know.
In his article entitled “Cuban Communism,” Irving Louis Horowitz outlined five points as to why
Castro did not openly embrace Marxist-Leninist ideology at the time of the triumph of his revolution.
The first point Horowitz made was that Soviet style communism would “elevate Havana to a supreme
place in the bureaucratic hierarchy,”16 and would thus take away some of Castro’s rural charisma. This
point is well taken considering the emphasis of Marxist doctrine on industry and the influence of Castro
on the success of the Cuban Revolution. Horowitz also addressed the issue of Castro’s charisma in his
second point in which he states that the bureaucracy of the Communist Party “threatened the
charismatic basis of Fidel’s leadership.”17 Several historians have believed that the presence of Castro
was vital to the success of the Cuban Revolution and that the marginalization of Castro’s charisma would
have threatened the overall success of the Revolution.
The third point Horowitz posed was that if Castro were to allow orthodox communist doctrine to
run his country, he would “be saddled with not only material but ideological dependence on the Soviet
Union.”18 This would prove problematic in a logistical sense based on the geographical location of Cuba
and its distance from the Soviet Union. Being forced to depend on a country literally on the other side of
the world for political and material sustenance would place the success of the Revolution in jeopardy.
The fourth point Horowitz made is that the adoption of orthodox communism would cause Cuba to be
politically and economically isolated from the rest of Latin America. Cuba’s expulsion from the
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Organization of American States on January 196219 after it was declared a communist state
demonstrates that this point was valid.
The final point Horowitz posed was that the adoption of orthodox communist doctrine would
crush the “revolutionary will” of the Cuban people. The adoption of Soviet authoritarian communism
would extinguish the “human quality that had overcome so many hardships and had actually made the
Cuban Revolution possible.”20 The action of adopting orthodox communism could very well crush this
“revolutionary will” due to the notion that such an action would simply cause Cuba to change hands
from one superpower to another. This point is the strongest element of Horowitz’s argument of the
historical context of the Cuban Revolution.
In order to fully understand the impact of this element in Horowitz’s theory, it is necessary to
analyze the relationship between Cuba and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. In
1895, the Cuban people revolted against Spain, their imperial homeland. The United States intervened
in Cuba’s defense and went to war against Spain in 1898. With Spain defeated, the United States
occupied Cuba and assisted in its reconstruction as an independent nation. In her dissertation entitled,
“Closed Door Imperialism: The Politics of Cuban-U.S. Trade, 1902-1933” Mary Speck analyzes the
efficacy of two political stipulations placed on Cuba from the United States: the Platt Amendment and
the Reciprocity Treaty. Speck explains the rationale for these two stipulations by quoting President
William McKinley and his desire for creating “singular ties of intimacy”21 between the United States and
Cuba.
The Platt Amendment served as the legal justification for the United States to intervene
militarily in Cuban politics in order to restore democratic order in the event the United States believed

19

Blight, Allyn and Welch, 17
Horowitz, 23
21
Mary Speck, “Closed Door Imperialism: The Politics of Cuban-U.S. Trade, 1902-1933” Hispanic American
Historical Review 83 (2005): 449
20

7
such actions to be necessary. The Reciprocity Act, promised Cuba that the United States would maintain
low tariff rates. Speck quotes the April 1901 edition of the Havana newspaper La Discusion in explaining
the rationale for these political stipulations: “The United States desires certain political advantages in
Cuba, while Cuba desires certain economic advantages in the United States.”22 Speck’s article sharply
criticized the Platt Amendment and the tariff rates. Instead of constructing Cuba’s national
infrastructure, Speck noted “U.S. trade and investment . . . ‘decapitalized’ ‘denationalized’ and
‘underdeveloped’ the island.”23
Speck identified the U.S. market economy as “an instrument of hegemony.”24 Speck points out
that although in the beginning European countries were able to maintain a hold in the Cuban economy,
the United States soon became the chief supplier of Cuban imports arriving at an average of 71% from
1915-192425. Speck does indicate however that in some instances the U.S. influence in Cuba did have
positive effects on the Cuban infrastructure. Speck identifies the U.S.-Cuban joint company the Cuban
Portland Cement Corporation as a positive example of U.S.-Cuban cooperation by indicating that this
company was capable of producing one thousand barrels of cement a day26.
The effects of these two acts of legislation served to frustrate Cuba’s attempts at resisting U.S.
incursion in their domestic affairs while they triggered economic and political failures in the country and
made the nation ripe for the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
U.S. economic domination in Cuba intensified during the 1950s right before the Cuban
Revolution. In his article entitled “Castro, Cuba, and the United States” (1967) Philip W. Bonsal analyzed
the American influence on the industries in Cuba from the 1940s to the late 1950s. Bonsal indicated that
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although the United States dominated only one third of Cuba’s sugar industry, Cuba’s primary export,
American companies still dominated Cuba’s modern infrastructure. This included the telephone, electric
light and power companies as well as two of the three crude oil refineries (the other company owned by
an Anglo-Dutch conglomerate) and a major railroad company on the eastern side of the island.27 Bonsal
adds that the retail merchandising and tourist markets were also dominated by American capitalists.
These two analyses demonstrate that although Cuba was formally declared independent in the
final years of the nineteenth century, Cuba was still dominated, this time by the United States. A half
century later, the Cuban Revolution was meant to liberate the people from the economic dependence
that the U.S. had imposed upon them. This is demonstrated by the statement, sin cuota, pero sin amo28:
a popular slogan that circulated shortly after the Revolution. The notion that the Cuban people would
eagerly accept a system in which they were wholly dependent, both ideologically and materially, on the
USSR is contradictory to the Cuban spirit of liberty. This sentiment is supported by a statement made by
Carlos Lechuga in his book entitled In The Eye of the Storm in which he says “the Cuban Revolution was
independent of the Cold War; it was a native product, whose roots went back to the first war of
independence against Spanish colonialism in the latter part of the last century.”29
Under these geopolitical and cultural circumstances, a unique style of communism evolved in
Cuba. In the same collection of articles, Horowitz explained that Cuban-style communism formed
naturally in a way that was contrary to traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Horowitz pointed out that
at the time of the Cuban Revolution; there was no proletariat, no urban working class to unite together
against the capitalist oppressors. In Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the proletariat is vitally important to a
successful communist revolution. However, as Horowitz also pointed out, Cuba was not an industrialized
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state, being that only 56 percent30 was urbanized and therefore could not have a fully developed
proletariat for a traditional communist revolution. As a result of this, Cuba could not survive on its own
industrial strength and would require imported industrial goods for sustenance and therefore could not
become self-sufficient.
Therefore in the doctrine of Cuban communism, the guerrilla is the driving force of social
revolution in lieu of the proletariat. While running for public office as a member of the Cuban Orthodox
Party, Castro spoke to Luis Conte Aguero, radio commentator and leader of the Orthodox Party. He was
reported to have said that he wanted to “organize the men of the 26th of July movement,”31 making
them into “an unbreakable body of fighters.”32
During the Cuban Revolution, Ernesto “Che” Guevara cemented this theory of the guerrilla’s
importance to social change in the following statement:
We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he
takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that
he fights to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and
misery. He launches himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular
moment with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold of these
institutions.33
Although Castro had vaguely defined himself as a “humanist” early in his political career, after
April 1959 he began to exhibit signs of moving rapidly to the left culminating a speech given in
December, 1961 in which he formally declared himself a communist.34 Sergei Khrushchev indicated that
this was due to the fact that on Castro’s visit to the United States he visited with Vice President Richard
Nixon instead of President Dwight Eisenhower. The latter had a golf game he had to attend. “Had the
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President taken a couple hours from his golf game [and] talked in a proper and respectful manner to the
visitor” Sergei Khrushchev noted: “history possibly would’ve taken a different course: no Cuban, let
alone missile crisis would have happened at all.”35
Although no surviving complete account explains the nature of the meeting in detail, Richard
Gott drew the connection that Nixon’s staunch anti-Communist stance compelled Castro to side with
the communists. Gott based his theory by referencing a statement made by Nixon stating that Castro
was “either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline.”36 Sergei Khrushchev
also speculates that if Eisenhower had taken the time to visit Castro, Cuba would have most likely
become a moderate democracy and would be “moderately friendly to the U.S. . . . like Costa Rica.”37
Sergei Khrushchev’s statement demonstrates an enormous amount of naivety and wishful
thinking. While it is true that if Eisenhower had received Castro instead of Nixon; Castro may not have
immediately become a communist, the structure of Cuban issues to be resolved with the United States
had the potential to produce antagonism between the two nations. The “human will” of the Cuban
Revolution was to rid itself of domination by the United States, therefore, anti-U.S. sentiments already
existed in Cuba without Castro’s communist transformation. This sentiment was intensified by Castro’s
First Declaration of Havana made shortly after the Triumph of the Revolution which states, “The People
of Cuba strongly condemn the imperialism of North America for its gross and criminal domination,
lasting for more than a century, of the peoples of Latin America.”38 This animosity strained tensions
between the U.S. and Cuba regardless of diplomatic protocol.
Although Castro was not officially a communist before his meeting with Nixon and may not have
declared himself a communist if that meeting had never occurred, other members of his movements
35
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such as Castro’s brother, Raul Castro and fellow revolutionary Che Guevara were either communists or
radical Marxists. This fact alarmed Washington as Gott pointed out. Gott strengthened his point by
referencing a memo written to Eisenhower by CIA chief Allen Dulles during the final days of the Cuban
Revolution indicating that, “Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the
Castro movement. If Castro takes over, they will probably participate in the government.”39 Therefore,
although Fidel Castro may not have been a Communist, the presence of Communists in his government
would have alarmed the U.S. government and caused tensions in U.S.-Cuban relations. Contrary to
Sergei Khrushchev’s speculation this mutual animosity and mistrust would prevent Cuba from becoming
a “moderately friendly” nation to the United States.
Fidel Castro fully outlined his political ideologies in a speech given December 1, 1961 in which he
said the following:
We began in the university to make the first contacts with the Communist Manifesto, with the
works of Marx and Engels and Lenin. That marked a process. I can say an honest confession, that
many of the things that we have done in the revolution are not things that we invented, not in
the least. When we left the university, in my particular case, I was really greatly influenced--- not
that I will say I was in the least a Marxist-Leninist.40
Castro concluded his speech by making the statement, “I am a Marxist-Leninist and I will be one
until the last days of my life.”41 Hugh Thomas, author of the book Cuba indicates that this was the first
time Castro publically declared himself as an “apprentice of Marxist-Leninism”42 stating that Cuba in the
future would be led by “collective leadership.”43
In declaring himself an “apprentice of Marxist-Leninism,” Castro stated that he subscribed to
Marxist theory as interpreted by Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. Marxist-Leninist theory states
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that imperialism is the highest form of capitalism, which coincides with Castro’s anti-U.S. political
stance. In declaring himself a Communist, Castro stated that he advocated the redistribution of wealth
in his nation. This is supported by the Agrarian Reform Law of June 3, 1959, the Law of Nationalization of
July 6, 1960, and Law 890 of October 14, 1960. These acts of legislation expropriated land and industries
in Cuba placing them in the hands of the Castro regime. As a result of these actions, American
companies with economic interest in Cuba issued 8,816 certified claims against Cuba totaling to
$1,799,548,568.69.44
Fidel Castro’s formal declaration as a Communist and a Marxist-Leninist resulted in the United
States attempting to isolate the island economically and politically. In 1960, the United States invoked a
trading embargo with Cuba. As these acts of aggression were taking place, Castro lived in fear of the
United States believing that the U.S. would invade his island and crush his regime. The presence of a
Communist dictatorship in the western hemisphere dramatically alarmed the United States because the
containment of Communist countries was a primary element of U.S. Cold War strategy.
Castro’s fears became a reality when 1,500 CIA-trained Cuban mercenaries attempted to invade
the island in April of 1962 in an event known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, known to the Cuban people as
Playa Giron invasion. This invasion was a poorly executed attempt by the Kennedy administration to try
to remove Castro from power and also violated the Act of Bogota, the document that established the
Organization of American States, which states “No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”45
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Castro would later speak of the invasion as a “fait accompli plan” which “existed for destroying the
Revolution despite the fact that at that point the Revolution wasn’t even officially Socialist.”46
Following this attempt, Castro was extremely wary of the United States. He feared that the U.S.
would mount another invasion and succeed in removing him from power. These fears were very well
grounded. On May 4, 1961, the Interagency Task Force of the U.S. National Security Council wrote an
analysis entitled “Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere” and drew the conclusion that “There is no
sure way of overthrowing Castro short of military intervention.”47 Another U.S. justification for military
intervention was that the removal of Castro would only partially solve America’s problem concerning
communism in Cuba, because if Castro were ever removed, he would easily be replaced by his fellow
revolutionary comrade Ernesto “Che” Guevara.48 In order to fully dismantle Cuba’s communist regime,
the United States would have to invade and occupy Cuba.
Shortly after the publication of “Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere” the CIA authorized
Operation Patty. This was a multifaceted plot designed to kill both Castro and his brother Raul while
creating a justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. This plan was scheduled to be executed July
26, 1961 during a nationwide celebration of the July 26th Movement. At this celebration, Castro and his
brother Raul would be targeted for assassination as they gave their speeches at functions in Havana and
Santiago de Cuba respectively.
The assassination of Raul Castro would take place from one of the houses close to the stadium
where Raul was scheduled to give a speech. A .30 caliber machine gun would be assembled in this house
and would scope out Raul while he was giving his speech. Shortly after the gunshot, four men armed
with grenades would enter the crowd and confirm the death of Raul. The assassins assumed that if this
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attack failed, Raul would flee to the airport in Santiago de Cuba to fly to Havana and therefore had
assembled six men armed with machine guns at the airport to shoot Raul on sight.

After the assassination of Raul Castro took place, mortar attacks were scheduled to go off at the
Hermanos Diaz oil refinery and near the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. CIA operatives would then
release a story stating that “Cuban military commanders, blinded by the assassination that had taken
the life of Raul Castro, had gone to the extreme of attacking the naval base.”49 This action would justify
U.S. military intervention. Shortly thereafter, the assassination Castro would be executed. The plan for
assassinating Fidel Castro involved placing an 82 millimeter mortar shell in the Plaza of the Revolution in
Havana near the stage where Castro was scheduled to give a speech. The size of the shell was
intentionally designed to kill as many people as possible targeting specifically Castro and other
subordinate members of the Cuban Revolutionary Government. After the assassination of Fidel Castro,
assassins and saboteurs already positioned in the Cuban provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas would
mortar buildings of communist party members and destroy bridges to impede Cuba’s ability to defend
itself.50

Operation Patty was authorized in the final days of June in 1961 but was not executed due to
the fact that Cuban security forces who had apparently infiltrated the CIA intercepted information about
the plan. The Cuban government allowed the plan to mature to the point where it knew that all parties
were identified and then canceled all events scheduled for July 26 and subsequently arrested all the
operatives. The Cuban government formally condemned the action on August 12, 1961.51
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pen outfitted with a finely crafted hypodermic needle capable of injecting poison into the user’s
bloodstream.52 The U.S. government planned to employ the Mafia as a delivery system for these devices
due to their connections with the island.53 Richard Bissell, a high ranking operative in the CIA Cuba
Project later stated, “I hoped the Mafia would achieve success. My philosophy during my last two or
three years in the agency was very definitely that the ends justified the means.”54

In his book, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965, Don Bohning
confirmed Acosta’s accounts on U.S. sponsored plots to assassinate Castro and built upon them by citing
other plans for defeating the Castro regime calling them “pretexts for invasion.” These plans include the
“Remember the Maine” plan by which an unmanned U.S. naval vessel en route to the U.S. Naval base at
Guantanamo Bay would be detonated in Cuban waters, prompting U.S. fighters to “’evacuate’ remaining
members of nonexistent crew.”55 This harkens back to the Maine Incident of 1898 which prompted the
U.S. to declare war on Spain. Another plan Bohning referenced was known as the “Communist Cuban
terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities, and even Washington.” Under this plan the
U.S. government planned on “sink[ing] a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated)”
stating that the U.S. could “foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.”56 Bohning also outlined a plan known as
“Elimination by Illumination,” a plan catering to the Catholics in Cuba which “consisted of spreading the
word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro [who] was the
anti-Christ.”57 Cuban Carlos Lechuga confirmed this plan in his book In the Eye of the Storm.
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On November 30, 1961, President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose: the largest
operation ever undertaken by the CIA. Operation Mongoose was a six phased operation designed to
remove Castro from power and to “insure the replacement of the Castro regime with a friendly
government.”58 This statement is supported by a memorandum written by Task Force W, the authors of
Operation Mongoose in a document entitled “Plan for Cuba.”

The first stage of the operation was entitled “Action” and was scheduled to go into effect in
March 1962. The purpose of action was to “start moving in” that is to say, infiltrate Cuba and prepare
for the uprising. The second stage of the operation was entitled “Build-Up” and was scheduled to take
place in April-July 1962. The purpose of “Build-Up” was the “activat[ion] [of] the necessary operations
inside Cuba for the revolution and concurrently applying for vital political, economic, and military type
support from outside Cuba.” The third stage of the operation was entitled “Readiness” and served as a
deadline for strategy. Stage four, entitled “Resistance” involved placing the guerrilla fighters in position
in Cuba. The fifth stage of Operation Mongoose was entitled “Revolt” and authorized the strategically
placed guerrilla fighters to begin their disturbances against the communist regime. The final stage of
Operation Mongoose was entitled simply as “Final” and would involve the “establishment of [a] new
government.”59

Operation Mongoose had a variety of contingency plans by which in the event of failure at any
moment by the Cuban guerrillas, as had been the case in the Bay of Pigs invasion, the United States
would intervene militarily in the Cuban counterrevolution.
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In the CINCLANT60 memorandum dated 25 September 1962, three different contingency plans
were outlined for military intervention in Cuba. The first plan was entitled OPLAN 314-61 and outlines a
standard plan for military intervention in Cuba. OPLAN 314-61 stated that airborne and amphibious
attacks would be conducted simultaneously in the vicinity of Havana reinforced by the garrison at
Guantanamo Bay. OPLAN 314-61 also mentioned “mop-up” operations in eastern Cuba. The timeframe
for OPLAN 314-61 stated that “this plan calls for the first U.S. landings on the 18th day after receipt of
this order to execute.” OPLAN 316-61 dealt with an elevated timetable and followed slightly different
tactics. This plan was designated as the “quick reaction plan” and involves air strikes executed five days
earlier than the standard OPLAN 314-61 timetable. The last contingency plan in this memorandum was
designated OPLAN 312-62 and dealt with the “fast application” of military intervention in Cuba in which
airstrikes would be executed “with time increments of 6, 12, and 24 hours from a no-warning
condition.”61 Military targets such as airfields, aircraft, naval vessels, and garrisons were given top
priority in this contingency plan.
During the same time Castro countered these acts of aggression by formulating his own military
schemes. One covert military plan Castro created was known as Operation Boomerang. Under the
conditions of Operation Boomerang, Castro would authorize sympathetic Cubans living in the United
States to attack military and civilian targets in the most populous American cities if the United States
ever invaded Cuba.62 The Castro regime also cracked down on possible subversive activities in Cuba by
passing an act of legislation known as Law 998 that was ratified in November 29, 1961. Law 998 stated
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that any member of a counterrevolutionary movement living in Cuba whether the movement was based
domestically or by a foreign government would be sentenced to death.63
The Castro regime also sought military aid from the Soviet Union during this time. In the latter
half of 1961, the Cuban government signed two military agreements with the Soviet government for aid
and military supplies. The first agreement, ratified on August 4, 1961 granted the Cuban government
$48.5 million in military aid and equipment.64 The second agreement, ratified on September 30, 1961
promised Cuba $149.55 million in military aid and equipment. Cuba was obligated to repay only $67.55
million of this aid over a ten year period at two percent interest.65 The third military agreement signed
later in July of 1962 was Operation Anadyr66 in which nuclear missiles were transported from the Soviet
Union to Cuba. From 1961-1962 the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc nations also sent economic
aid to Cuba amounting to the sum of $570 million dollars.67 Russia also placed a quota for 3 million tons
of sugar to be imported from Cuba in 1962.68
Khrushchev was also well aware of American aggression against Cuba that he had to protect his
communist ally in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore he began to authorize plans to put missiles and
nuclear weapons into Cuba in order to deter the United States. This is well articulated through hindsight
in his memoirs which read:
We wanted Cuba to remain revolutionary and socialist, and we knew Cuba needed help in order
to do so . . . we had no other way of helping them meet the American threat except to install
our missiles on the island, so as to confront the aggressive forces of the United States with a
dilemma: if you invade Cuba, you’ll have to face a nuclear missile attack against your own
cities.69
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However, some historians have suggested that protecting Cuba from American aggression may
not have been the only reason behind placing the missiles in Cuba. Other reasons included, repairing the
missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, bettering Soviet relations with Latin
America, and regaining prestige in the eyes of their Chinese counterparts.70 Don Munton and David A.
Welch indicated in their book entitled The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History that a schism occurred
between China and the Soviet Union in terms of Marxist doctrine. Munton and Welch indicated that
Chinese communist leaders questioned Khrushchev’s orthodoxy in Marxist ideology and his resolve
against the spread of capitalism. Munton and Welch theorized that a possible reason for Khrushchev
putting the missiles in Cuba was to prove the resolve of Khrushchev and the Soviet Union against
capitalist aggression thus regaining prestige in the eyes of the Chinese communists.71 If this was his
intention it dramatically backfired at the end of the crisis.
Other possible ulterior motives aside, Khrushchev authorized the sending of missiles to Cuba
under the guise of protecting Cuba from another American invasion. This is supported by a statement
made by Khrushchev to Castro stating: “I am absolutely sure that in revenge for the defeat at Playa
Giron, the Americans are going to launch an invasion against Cuba, not with mercenaries this time, but
with their own armed forces. We have reliable intelligence on that.72
Khrushchev was correct in predicting this as stated by previous evidence. Khrushchev is also
reported to have told Castro, “We have to pay the Americans in kind, to give them a taste of their own
medicine, and make them feel what it’s like to live with nuclear weapons trained on you.”73
In retrospect, Castro is reported to have said the following about Premier Khrushchev:
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Nikita was very clever in the way he presented the issue to the other leaders of the Soviet party
and in his underlying thinking . . . in light of the facts we know today about the real international
relationship of forces, it’s clear that a remedy was needed . . . If what they really had was only
fifty or sixty missiles, there is no doubt that the presence of those forty two missiles significantly
improved the situation; it almost doubled the effective delivery systems.74
Hugh Thomas in his authoritative book, Cuba, indicated that although the placement of Soviet
missiles in Cuba shifted the balance of nuclear power to the Soviets’ favor using the best of the Russian’s
nuclear arsenal, Soviet military strength still floundered compared to that of the U.S. In the early 1960s,
according to Thomas, the Russian nuclear arsenal had “five times fewer nuclear delivery weapons” than
the arsenal of the United States.75 Thomas expanded on this statement by indicating that the Russian
military possessed between 350 to 700 short range nuclear missiles. From Russia the furthest reach of
these missiles was to Europe. They were incapable of reaching the United States from Russia. Thomas
also points out that while the U.S. possessed 600 intercontinental ballistic missiles, Russia only had 200
in its arsenal.76 Therefore, although Russia sent very powerful elements of its nuclear arsenal to Cuba
and such actions did shift the balance of nuclear power into their favor, the United States still was
superior to the Soviet Union and any nuclear exchange would definitely annihilate Cuba.
On May 29, 1962 a group of Soviet nuclear scientists officially disguised as agricultural
technicians including Marshal Sergei Biryuzov vice minister of defense,77 arrived at Cuba with the
preliminary plans for placing missile launchers in Cuba. This plan was officially designated as an
agricultural project. In this preliminary stage of placing nuclear missiles into Cuba, Castro and his brother
Raul met with these Soviet representatives in Havana. Castro later recalled the event in his most recent
biography:
After offering the information I mentioned they asked what I thought should be done to avoid
the attack. I answered calmly: ‘Make a public statement warning the United States, just as they
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do in similar circumstances, that an attack on Cuba will be considered an attack on the Soviet
Union.78
According to Castro, the Soviet representatives “sat and thought about it for a while and then
added that in order for it not to be just a simple statement, certain concrete measures had to be
adopted.” The delegates then concluded their discussion by stating that “it was a good idea to install a
minimal number of medium-range missiles in Cuba.”79
After this initial step, Khrushchev began to make promises to the Cuban people that he either
did not keep or that had different connotations to the Cuban people than he had intended. As part of
the Cuban delegation to the Soviet Union which took place in June of 1962, Raul Castro had asked
Premier Khrushchev “What precautions have you taken in case the operation is discovered by the U.S.
before it is made public?” Khrushchev is reported to have responded, “Don’t worry, I’ll grab Kennedy by
the balls and make him negotiate. After all, they have surrounded us with their bases, in Turkey, and in
other places.”80 Khrushchev also repeatedly stated to Raul and to Che Guevara that in any situation, he
was willing to send the Baltic fleet to Cuba to protect the Cuban people from American aggression.
This account of Khrushchev’s actions is taken from Tomas Diez Acosta’s book, October 1962: The
‘Missile’ Crisis as Seen from Cuba. Acosta’s account of Khrushchev’s actions debunked Sergei
Khrushchev’s theory that Premier Khrushchev was innocently pushed into placing the missiles into Cuba
as a deterrent. In order to fully understand the differences of interpretations it is necessary to
understand the life and career of Acosta. The latter joined the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
in 1961 and was mobilized in Cuba during the crisis as a political instructor of Military Unit 2562 in the
western region of Cuba. Acosta then taught history from 1970 to 1986 at the General Maximo Gomez
Academy of the FAR. Acosta received a degree in political science from the University of Havana in 1976.
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Finally, Acosta retired from the Cuban military in 1998 at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 81 Acosta had
access to materials from the Cuban perspective that point out the “other side” of Sergei Khrushchev’s
naïve account of his father’s actions during the crisis.
In August 1962, Khrushchev sent Aleksandr Alekseev, the recently appointed Soviet Ambassador
to Cuba, to Havana with a draft of the agreement that would place nuclear weapons on Cuban soil.
Castro vehemently did not agree with the text of the agreement because he believed that this
agreement should appear as a military agreement for mutual defense. Later on that month, Castro sent
Che Guevara and Emilio Aragones to Moscow carrying their revised version of the agreement as a
counterproposal. Khrushchev agreed to the proposed revisions but insisted that the agreement not be
published until after the missiles were operational. This was the first of several important differences of
opinion between the Soviets and the Cubans. Although Khrushchev was confident that the missiles
would be properly hidden from sight, Che and Aragones both believed that the missiles would be
discovered long before they were operational.82
After this meeting, the Soviet Union began to send an entire arsenal of nuclear weaponry to
Cuba. Thirty six R-12 MRBM missiles were sent in three regiments of twelve to the island. The yield of
each nuclear warhead ranged from 200 kilotons to 1 megaton or more. In simpler terms, a single
warhead possessed between fifteen to seventy times the destructive power as the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima.83 The R-12 missiles on which the warheads would be delivered had a range of
1,300 miles making it possible for New York, Dallas and Chicago as well as many cities in Latin America to
become targets.84
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The Soviets also sent 24 R-14 IRBM missiles to Cuba in two regiments of twelve. The warheads
for the R-14 missiles were just as destructive as the warheads designed for the R-12. The actual missiles
never reached Cuba, however, several of the warheads arrived at Cuba’s port of La Isabela on the Soviet
ship Aleksandrovsk without American detection on October 23. Had the missiles been installed in Cuba,
the targeting range would have been such that virtually any city in the continental United States would
have been a target as well as most Canadian and Latin American cities.85
The Soviet Union also provided Cuba with an arsenal of conventional weapons. Four reinforced
motorized rifle regiments amounting to 14,000 soldiers were deployed with a wide variety of equipment
at their disposal including tanks and antiaircraft artillery. Six Luna missiles equipped with 2 megaton
nuclear warheads were also sent to Cuba. The Luna missile was a short range missile with only a range
of forty miles. Khrushchev had authorized the Luna missiles to carry nuclear missiles in September
1962.86 Every nuclear warhead required specific conditions for storage as General Beloborodov
explained “One of the big problems that had to be resolved in connection with the nuclear warheads
was the climate in Cuba. The warheads required humidity below 50 percent and a temperature not
higher than 20 degrees [Celsius] so air-conditioned vehicles had to be built for their transportation and
maintenance.”87
As part of the agreement Cuba received from the Soviet Union 42 IL-28 bombers, each of them
outfitted to carry an eight to twelve megaton nuclear bomb to targets within a 600 mile radius. The
Soviets also sent forty of their most advanced fighter planes at the time: the MiG-21.88
The presence of such a destructive arsenal had concerned Castro as he indicated in an interview
recorded in 1997.
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We did not like the rockets. If it had only been a matter of our defense, we would not have
accepted the missiles. But don’t go and think that it was fear of the dangers that could have
followed from having the missiles here; it was because of the way in which this could tarnish the
image of the Revolution, and we were very zealous about the image of the Revolution in the rest
of Latin America; and this in our opinion had a high political cost for our country’s image.89

This statement contradicted the statements he had made in 1962 which indicate possible
hindsight and political flip-flopping to save face. This is also a demonstration of revisionism: a method
by which historians submit new hypotheses counter established interpretations in order to “revise”
them. This is seen throughout interpretations of this event done by Cuban historians. By adopting a
revisionist stance, Cuban historians and the Castro regime itself have attempted to marginalize the
aggression demonstrated by the regime during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The task of installing the missiles in Cuba was placed under the authority of Marshall Sergei
Biryuzov, a man described by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan as “not very bright. . .”90
The missiles were placed at various locations under the cover of palm trees. The storage for the missiles
proved to be a tactical error in procedure. As Mikoyan would later explain “I myself had seen those
palms and there was no way anybody was going to hide rocket launch sites under them.”91
General Gribkov later explained the logistical issues of concealing the nuclear warheads which
can be seen in the following text:
We foresaw, naturally, the possibility that U.S. intelligence might discover us. As it turned out,
on October 14 they photographed white slabs of concrete. Naturally, they could be seen quite
well from the air and were very difficult to disguise. . . Some of our comrades. . . thought that
the missiles could be placed in such a way that they could not be distinguished from palm trees,
but that was a stupid conclusion, because the missile sights had to be prepared, cables, hung,
launching pads built—in other words, everything was complicated. Naturally, their intelligence
discovered us for all those reasons. That’s what intelligence is for. But the fact is, they
discovered us late.92
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Castro later explained that the issue of concealing the missiles and warheads was an avoidable
mistake:
If we had known what those missiles were like and if the question of camouflage had been
posed to us, it would have been easy to decide what to do… In a country where there are so
many construction projects, so many big chicken barns and all sorts of things, it would have
been the easiest thing in the world to build all those installations under roofs or something else,
and they would have never been discovered.93
On October 22, 1962, the crisis began when a U-2 spy plane flying overhead photographed
missile silos being erected in San Cristobal, Cuba. This event also, Castro explains could have been
avoided:
The question arises. What were the surface-to-air missiles there for? What were they doing
there? Why put in surface-to-air missiles and allow U-2s to fly over? To permit this was, I
believe, unquestionably a political mistake. I don’t blame the military men for that . . .
Undoubtedly, they had strict orders . . . I am sure that they had orders not to fire on the U-2s . . .
but it is incredible to me that . . . those planes were allowed to fly over. . .What were those
surface-to-air missiles doing there?94
As a result of this discovery, the American Strategic Air Command (SAC) was placed on
maximum alert and the garrison of American troops at Guantanamo Bay was dramatically increased.
The United States was planning for armed combat. This is evidenced by the order given by the
commander of the base at Guantanamo Bay stating that all civilian residents must evacuate.95
While the U.S. military was reorganizing itself, President Kennedy arranged an Executive
Committee on October 16, known as ExComm consisting of 25 members including himself, Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.96
In their meetings, members of ExComm developed a series of options or “tracks” to choose in
order to resolve the crisis. The first option or “Track A” dealt with political pressure on Cuba and the
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Soviet Union followed by military intervention “if satisfaction is not received.” “Track B” or the second
option favored a direct assault on Cuba “without prior warning.”97 The third option, “Track C” served as
a hybrid for the two previous “tracks” stating that political pressures should be placed on Cuba as well
as a total naval blockade of the island. “Track C” also left declaring war on Cuba as a possibility. The final
option, “Track D” stated that the United States would conduct a full scale invasion of Cuba in order to
“take Cuba away from Castro.”98 The Kennedy Administration was willing to commit 85,000 men (40,000
of which were Marines), 183 U.S. Navy warships, and 579 aircraft99 to a potential invasion of Cuba. The
Administration eventually authorized a military blockade (officially termed as a “quarantine”) around
Cuba consisting of sixteen destroyers, three cruisers, an anti-submarine aircraft carrier, and six utility
ships.100 These vessels were given orders to disable, instead of sink any hostile Russian vessel heading to
Cuba.
During this time, Castro began to reorganize his political and military structure. He reassembled
his military defense units in the mountains into three different divisions: eastern, central and western.
Each of these divisions had their own military presence and political jurisdiction. Castro appointed his
brother Raul as commander of the Eastern province. Commander Juan Almeida was named the leader of
the central province and Che Guevara assumed command of the western province in Pinar del Rio.
Castro remained in Havana to maintain control of Cuba from its capital.101 The eastern part of the island,
under the command of Raul Castro united together for battle under the slogan “Listos para vencer.”102
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Thomas also points out that during the crisis 20,000 Russian troops were garrisoned on the island and
were ready to defend Cuba in the event of an invasion.103
On October 23, 1962, Kennedy delivered his televised speech calling for Cuba to disarm and
declaring a naval quarantine. To Kennedy’s speech, Castro gave his rebuttal: “If the United States desires
disarmament, magnificent! Let us all support a policy for the dismantling of bases, of troops throughout
the world… but we are not in agreement with a policy that calls for disarming ourselves in the face of
the aggressors.”104 On the same day Castro made a declaration which in Hoy the Cuban National
Newspaper. The following is an excerpt:
At 5:40 p.m. the Prime Minister, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, ordered the entire
Revolutionary Armed Forces to be placed on combat alert status, taken only in cases of critical
danger. This measure was taken in response to the reports coming from the United States, and
to the mobilization of U.S. military forces against our country. The nation has awakened on a
war footing, ready to repel any attack.105

On October 24, Castro met with his chief of intelligence Captain Manuel de Jesus Quinones to
calculate how many ships and soldiers the Americans would use in order to mount an invasion of Cuba.
Quinones stated that United States would use five or six divisions and would need between 120 to 130
ships to transport them all. Such an invasion would take five to six days to accomplish. Quinones also
noted that if the 82nd Airborne Division were ever activated, the first stage of the invasion would take
place five or six hours after.106
To combat the possibility of air raids, Castro placed reserve batteries of antiaircraft artillery on
the outskirts of Havana. Twenty four of these batteries were placed at three points in the city and were
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mobile in order to facilitate easy relocation. Castro justified this by saying, “There is no political reason
whatsoever why we shouldn’t shoot down an aircraft flying 300 feet over our heads.”107
On October 25, Castro developed the Defensa Popular or People’s Defense, which consisted of
men and women of all different civilian professions. The DP was assembled into various combat
battalions and civil defense units including health and sanitation brigades, firefighters, and repair units
in order to assist the war effort should combat arise.108
On October 26, Castro met with Soviet General Issa Pliyev to discuss the issue of American
planes flying over Cuban airspace. Castro told Pliyev that he would order his military to shoot down any
low flying American aircraft saying, “We cannot tolerate these… overflights because any day at dawn
they’re going to destroy all these units.”109
Later that day Pliyev sent a coded message to Moscow saying that an attack was imminent and
that he was going to disperse techniki: the act of moving the warheads from their storage units closer to
the missiles so they could be used in the event of an American attack. Pliyev received a message back
from Moscow stating, “You are forbidden to apply nuclear warheads to FKR, Luna, IL-28s without
authorization from Moscow.”110
That night Castro sent a message to Premier Khrushchev stating the dire situation of the Cuban
people. The following is an excerpt from that letter dated October 26:
After analysis of the situation and the reports in our possession, I consider aggression to be
almost imminent—within the next twenty-four to seventy-two hours. There are two possible
variants: the first and most probable is an air attack . . . the second which is less probable
though entirely possible is invasion . . . Should the second variant take place and the imperialists
invade Cuba with the intention of occupying [the country], the dangers of this aggressive policy
for humanity are so great that after such an event the Soviet Union must never allow
circumstances in which the imperialists might carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I say this
because I believe that the imperialists’ aggressiveness has become extremely dangerous, and if
they do indeed perform an act so brutal and in such brazen violation of universal law and
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morality as invading Cuba, that would be the moment to eliminate that danger for ever, in an
act of the most legitimate self-defense. However hard and terrible the solution might be, there
is no other.111
The content of the message was read to Premier Khrushchev by Oleg Troyanovsky who told
Khrushchev, “In Castro’s view, in the face of and inevitable clash with the U.S.A., the imperialists must
not be allowed to deliver a strike” and then corrected himself by saying, “to be the first to deliver a
nuclear strike.”112 Khrushchev was appalled by this statement and stated, “It is insanity… We have
supplied the missiles in order to prevent an assault on the island, to preserve Cuba, to defend socialism,
while he, not only is he to perish himself, he’s dragging us down with him.”113 This letter provided
incentive for Khrushchev to negotiate with Kennedy exclusively while leaving Castro and the Cuban
people out of the negotiations.
Cuban historians have posed several arguments that question this. Tomas Diez Acosta stated in
the seventh chapter of his book that theories suggesting that this letter pushed Khrushchev to
independently broker for a solution to the conflict “lack[s] any objective basis114” and noted that the
United States and the Soviet Union were already negotiating for peace before Castro’s letter of October
26 was sent. Although this is true, the content of the letter and the reaction of Premier Khrushchev as
told by his own son also emphasize the notion that it would not be prudent to include the Cuban people
in the negotiations due to the ambitions blatantly stated by their leader. Had this letter not been sent,
or had it contained a different message, it is possible that Khrushchev may have let the Cuban people in
on negotiations.
By adopting a revisionist stance, Cuban historian Carlos Lechuga attempted to clarify Castro’s
intentions in his book entitled In the Eye of the Storm. Lechuga explained that Castro dictated his letter
to Soviet First Secretary Monakhov who evidently did not speak Spanish well. Lechuga stated that the
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letter was written in Russian by “another functionary”115 named Darusenko who translated Castro’s
notes. Lechuga’s revisionist theory indicates that the real nature of Castro’s message was lost in
translation.
This theory is very difficult to believe based on the evidence. If Castro’s message had been
misunderstood, he would have sent a follow up message that clarified his intentions. It is true that
Castro doubted that Khrushchev fully understood the meaning of his message and did send follow up
messages to clarify his intentions, but the content of those messages only serve to strengthen the
meaning of the October 26th letter. The following is an excerpt from a message written to Khrushchev by
Castro on October 31:
You based [your letter] on the alarming news you say you have received from Cuba and, lastly,
my cable of 27 October. I do not know what news you may have received; I am simply referring
to the message I sent you the night of the 26 October, received by you on the 27th. What we did
in the face of events, Comrade Khrushchev, was prepare ourselves to fight. In Cuba there was
but one kind of alarm: the alarm that called our people to arms. When in our judgment the
imperialist attack became imminent, I decided that I should communicate that news to you, and
alert both the government and the Soviet [military command]—since there were Soviet forces
committed to fighting alongside us in the defense of the Republic of Cuba against outside
attack—of the possibility of an attack that it was not within our power to halt, although we
might indeed resist it . . . The danger could not daunt us, because we have felt it hanging over
our country for many years, and to a certain extent we have become used to it . . . The eyes of
many men, Soviet and Cuban, who were willing to die with supreme dignity, wept as they
learned of the surprising and unexpected and practically unconditional decision to withdraw the
weapons. You may not know to what degree the Cuban people were prepared to fulfill their
duty to the patria and to humanity.116
This excerpt is taken directly from Castro’s most recent biography, the most current source. Had
Castro been misquoted he would have stated so either in the letter or in the interviews conducted for
this biography. The second half of this letter does indicate, however, that the Soviets attack after “the
imperialist attack.”117
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In any case, compelling Khrushchev to launch the missiles would have been a monumental task
due to his views concerning the function of the missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev believed that they were
more of a deterrent instead of weapons to be fired, as he would explain to his colleagues. “Every idiot
can start a war, but it is impossible to win this war [with nuclear weapons]. Therefore these missiles
[are] . . . to scare them, to restrain them . . . [and] give them back some of their own medicine.”118
Khrushchev therefore forbade anyone from mounting the nuclear warheads on the missiles.
Nikita Khrushchev’s son, Sergei Khrushchev later asserted that his father never intended to use the
missiles in the first place by explaining that his father “felt that would have made it easier for a madman
to start a war.”119 As a result the nuclear weapons were never used.
On October 27, the Cuban military began to open fire on American planes, as per Castro’s order.
“We could say that the war started in Cuba on October the 27th in the morning. Of course, those fast
flying jet planes, as soon as they heard the first shots, went higher to evade our artillery . . . We couldn’t
shoot down any of the low-flying planes. But we demonstrated our resistance.” Castro later
explained.120 In an act of solidarity, the Soviets began to fire their antiaircraft artillery as well. As a result,
an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson was shot down at 10:17 A.M. over Banes
in Eastern Cuba. On the same day, Castro wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General saying, “Cuba is
willing to discuss its difference with the United States as much as necessary, and to do everything it can
to cooperate with the United Nations to resolve the present crisis; but Cuba flatly rejects any act
violating the sovereignty of our country.”121
On October 28, Khrushchev announced that he would remove the missiles and nuclear
warheads from Cuba in exchange for the United States withdrawing its own Jupiter missiles which were
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located in Turkey. Kennedy had asked that this be kept a secret. As per the agreement, President
Kennedy publically proclaimed that the United States would never invade Cuba. Khrushchev had made
this deal without consulting Castro. In fact, according to his most recent biography, Castro learned of the
exchange through the international press instead of Khrushchev himself. The news of the deal hit the
Cuban people with indignation as Castro later recalled:
When the news reached us . . .it produced great indignation, because we had felt that we had
become some kind of bargaining chip. Not only was this a decision taken without consulting us,
several steps were taken without informing us. They could have informed us of the messages of
the 26th and the 27th we heard over the radio on the 28th that there had been an agreement . . .
the reaction of our nation was of profound indignation, not relief.122

Upon hearing the news personally, Castro “swore, kicked the wall and broke a looking glass in
his fury.”123
Later that afternoon, Castro made a public announcement stating that “The guarantees
mentioned by President Kennedy that there will be no aggression against Cuba will be ineffective unless,
in addition to the removal of the naval blockade that he promises, the following measures among others
are adopted.”124 Castro then drew a five point plan outlining the conditions for post-crisis relations
between Cuba and the United States.
The first point of Castro’s plan was that the economic embargo placed on Cuba by the United
States in 1960 must be lifted. This would enable Cuba to trade freely with any nation in the world. The
second point in Castro’s plan was that the United States must end all subversive activities designed to
remove the communist regime from power. Castro defined these activities as the dropping of
explosives by air, sea and land vehicles, the organization of invasions by Cuban exiles or others, and acts
of espionage and sabotage. The third point of Castro’s plan was that the acts of piracy undertaken by
the United States and Puerto Rico were to cease. The fourth point was that the United States would
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recognize the sovereignty of Cuban airspace and waters and would never send intruders again. The fifth
and last point of Castro’s plan was that the United States must withdraw from its garrison at
Guantanamo Bay and return the territory to Cuba.125
All of these points were rejected by the United States.126
The aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis had a devastating effect on the Cuban people. Che
Guevara was inspecting his military units as commander of the garrison at Pinar del Rio when he
received the news. Eye witnesses described that Che “went mad, threw his beret to the floor and
furiously repeated that this was a violation because he had conversations in Moscow and they had been
for something different.”127
At this time, according to rumor, Castro supposedly instructed President Dorticos to handle the
public affairs of the country while he took the month off to recover from the political blow. Cuban
citizens began to write letters to the Soviet Embassy in disgust saying that the Soviet Union was using
Cuba as a bargaining chip to resolve their issues with the United States.128
On November 1, Castro made a declaration to the Cuban people saying, “It is a shameful policy
to hide the most serious issues from public opinion. It is difficult for the Communists to criticize the
Soviet leadership, but you cannot refrain from doing so if you want to follow your conscience and be in
agreement with history.”129 Ironically enough, no other communist nation reported on this declaration.
Throughout the month of November 1962, the Chinese Embassy in Havana organized large
demonstrations in solidarity for the Cuban people. These demonstrations were intended to ensure that
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the problems of the crisis would be resolved without alienating Cuba. During this time Cubans began to
align with the Chinese communists which took prestige away from the Soviet communists.130
In spite of all these events and sentiments, Khrushchev believed the crisis was a victory for both
the Soviet Union and Cuba. He articulated his views to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of the National Agrarian
Reform Institute in December 1962:
We have also felt a lot of bitterness. . . We have never declared that the missiles are going to be
used to convert Cuba into a launching pad against imperialism . . . Only fools can claim that we
placed the missiles there with the intention of keeping them . . . We consider that we have
achieved a victory for Cuba and for the Soviet Union, that the objectives we had when we
placed them there have been achieved. We have retreated tactically, but they have retreated
fundamentally. I repeat: we have not retreated on any front, we are not on the defensive
anywhere; I insist, anywhere, even in Cuba. We are on the offensive everywhere.131
In the same visit, Khrushchev is also reported to have asked senior delegate member and leader
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, “Tell me, why is Fidel so angry with me? Doesn’t he know that I love him like a
son?” To which Rodriguez replied, “That’s just the problem, Nikita, he’s not your son. He’s the leader of
a sovereign country, in spite of what you people did to us in the October crisis.”132

However, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party is not of the same opinion as
Khrushchev as they articulated in a report in October 1964 which states “All in all, the missile crisis of
1962 caused serious damage to Soviet-Cuban relations and in 1964 ‘we still feel them.’”133
In April 1963, Castro went to Moscow in order to achieve a permanent commitment from the
Soviet Union to defend Cuba in the event of a hostile attack. Castro wanted Cuba to enter the Warsaw
Pact and be militarily aligned with the Soviet Union. The Soviets declined both attempts of admission in
order to avoid giving Kennedy an excuse not to adhere to the declaration that ended the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Later in January 1964, Castro returned to Moscow and received a statement that the Soviet Union
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would defend Cuba from any aggression with all means at their disposal, but Cuba would never be
admitted to the Warsaw Pact.134
Cuban-Soviet relations were not the same after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In January 1968, Castro
gave a speech to the Central Communist Party and described the early relations between Cuba and the
Soviet Union: “At that time we had a very high regard for the Soviet Union, I think more than it
deserved.”135 In the same speech, Castro described the Soviet pact of placing nuclear warheads in Cuba
as “one of the most incredible hoaxes ever written… it was the work of bureaucratic cretins, absolutely
impolitic.”136
The Cuban Missile Crisis in many ways caused more problems than it solved. As a direct result of
the crisis, Soviet influence in Latin America suffered dramatically, according to Che Guevara. The Soviets’
prestige suffered and allowed China to move in and win the hearts and minds of Cuban citizens.
Although Khrushchev succeeded in protecting Cuba from an American invasion, he did so in a way that
indicated he“[had not] thought things through or prepared backup plans for various contingencies. He
badly misjudged the American response, improvised madly when he was found out, and was fortunate
the crisis ended as safely as it did.”137
The Cuban perspective in this conflict indicates that the Cubans saw themselves independent
from the two superpowers. Cuban historians Gott, Thomas, Acosta and Lechuga demonstrate this very
well in their interpretations of the event. The arguments posed by these historians effectively state that
the U.S. was erroneous in stating that Cuba and Castro were “Soviet puppets.” Soviet historians, such as
Sergei Khrushchev confirm this point especially by citing the acceleration of Soviet-U.S. negotiations
after the startling letter from Castro to Khrushchev dated October 26. This event indicates a gap in
strategy and intentions of both parties concerned indicating that the relationship between Cuba and the
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Soviet Union was not as paternal as the U.S. had suspected. This is the strongest element of Sergei
Khrushchev’s interpretation of this event; his weakest point is his overwhelming naivety concerning the
relationship between the United States and Cuba.
After researching this topic in greater detail, it has become my interpretation that the Soviet
historians’ strongest point is the Cuban historians’ weakest point. Both Acosta and Lechuga attempt to
clarify Castro’s meaning and intentions in his letter to Khrushchev of October 26 by revisionist means.
These arguments, however, are poorly crafted and do not reflect the views of the parties concerned,
namely Castro. It is my interpretation that instead of viewing the missiles and warheads as a deterrent,
in the way Nikita Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet leadership intended, Castro viewed the
missiles as a possible offensive weapon to finally rid Cuba of the looming American presence that had
threatened his government early in his regime.
Castro’s choice to view the missiles as an offensive weapon destroyed any possibility for Soviet
military aid in the future as demonstrated by the repeated Soviet refusal to add Cuba to the Warsaw
Pact. This demonstrates that the Soviet leadership was aware of the volatile aggressive tendencies that
existed between the United States and Cuba and that adding Cuba as an integral part of its collective
would only heighten Cold War tensions to an unnecessary level.
The strain on Cuban-Soviet relations after the crisis only proved to widen the gap between Cuba
and the Soviet Union. This is demonstrated by Castro’s refusal to sign the Arms Control Treaties of
October-November 1963, acts of legislation that Khrushchev had brokered with Kennedy during the
crisis. Castro vehemently refused to sign this Limited Test Ban treaty on the grounds that Cuba was “in
the neighborhood of Yankee imperialism.”138 On January 2, 1965, on the sixth anniversary of the
Triumph of the Cuban Revolution, Castro formally denounced the Soviet Union and declared that it may
be necessary someday to separate Cuba from “the socialist camp” due to irreconcilable differences. Also
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in this speech, Castro declared that Cuba “must find solutions which bring about the unity of form and
substance, and not the divorce between form and substance.”139
In their book, Sad & Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile
Crisis, James G. Blight and Phillip P. Brenner argue that this statement was a declaration that Russia
would never “Sovietize” Cuba. I concur with this interpretation based on the fundamental grounds of
Cuban communism and the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. While it is true that the fallout of the
Cuban Missile Crisis strained Cuban-Soviet relations, and prevented the Soviets from providing military
aid to Cuba, the Soviet Union continued to provide economic aid and sugar quotas to Cuba until its
collapse in the early 1990s.
The Cuban Missile Crisis had the potential for a disaster of apocalyptic proportions. The lack of
ideological and tactical unity on the side of the Soviets and the Cubans coupled with the vague
assumptions made by the United States about Cuba nearly caused a chain reaction that engulfed the
entire world in nuclear war.
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